We augment the standard Crawford-Sobel (Econometrica 1982) model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to use a costly signal (\burned money"); the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information; and the extent to which burning money is the preferred instrument for information transmission.
Introduction
Legend has it that in 509 B.C. Mucius Scaevola was caught trying to kill Lars Porsena, the king of Clusium, who was besieging Rome. When brought before Porsena, Scaevola revealed that he was but the¯rst of three hundred Romans who had sworn to kill him. Porsena threatened to torture Scaevola ¤ We are grateful to the referees and an associate editor for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Austen-Smith is also grateful to the NSF for support under grant SBR-9804877.
unless he divulged details of the Roman plot. Scaevola refused, claiming he would never betray his fellows. Recognizing that such a claim was the epitome of cheap talk, Scaevola proceeded to push his right hand into the altar¯re and hold it there until it burned o®. Porsena found the signal credible, released Scaevola (which, not incidentally, means \left-handed") and made peace with Rome [?, 468] .
Although somewhat extreme, Mucius Scaevola's behaviour clearly illustrates that in many cases cheap talk is not the only means of communication. In particular, informed parties typically have the opportunity to impose costs on themselves. While we expect most people to draw the line short of self-immolation, we also expect that most people have the willingness and ability to accept some direct loss in utility to transmit information in a more credible manner than employing cheap talk alone. A common euphemism for such self-imposed losses in utility (e.g. [?] ), and the one we adopt here, is that of \burned money".
The canonic model for strategic cheap talk communication is due to Crawford and Sobel [?] . Subsequent literature applying variants of the Crawford/Sobel model is growing and varied. 1 But, as suggested above, purely costless signaling is a polar case. Thus, the extent to which results derived from applications of the polar case to substantive problems are robust, depends on the extent to which the polar case o®ers a good approximation to situations in which there is also some possibility of costly signaling. In the sequel, we address the robustness issue by augmenting a particular version of the standard Crawford/Sobel model of cheap talk communication in the presence of asymmetric information, allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The¯rst main result is that the set of equilibria can be dramatically increased when costly signals can be used. In particular, given a su±cient budget, the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria to the strategic communication game always contains a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria, with the separating equilibrium at one end of the continuum and the pooling equilibrium at the other. The second main result is that the availability of costly signals can improve the precision of cheap talk communication. On the other hand, whether the availability of costly signals can induce in°uential cheap talk in situations other than those in which such signaling is possible without burned money, depends on the details of the environment. We provide two results on when the possibility of burning money does not a®ect the opportunities for cheap talk commu-nication, and an example in which in°uential cheap talk is possible only if costly signals can also be used.
Apart from substantive applications, there is also increasing attention being paid to equilibrium re¯nements for cheap talk games.
2 Although this paper does not concern such re¯nements directly, some of our results bear on the use of e±ciency criteria to select the most informative equilibrium in particular games. Speci¯cally, Crawford and Sobel [?] , Gilligan and Krehbiel [?] and others have argued for using (loosely speaking) the most informative available equilibrium when looking for predictions from the model in applied settings. And this selection is justi¯ed in most cases both because it is the unique ex ante e±cient equilibrium and because it de¯nes the upper bound on credible information transmission. However, the possibility of using burned money to signal information leads to multiple ex ante e±cient equilibria and drives a wedge between the two selection criteria.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 examines equilibria to the model, focussing on the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and on the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information. Section 4 illustrates the results with an example much-used in the applied literature and, for this example, develops some welfare comparisons. Section 5 concludes.
Model
The basic setup is due to Crawford and Sobel [?] . At the start of the game, Nature privately reveals the value of a parameter t 2 [0; 1] to the sender; having observed t, the sender transmits a signal to the receiver, who then takes an action a 2 <; payo®s are then distributed to both agents. The sender's signal may be costless (cheap talk) or costly (burned money). The critical distinction between the two is that only the latter directly enters the sender's utility function. Speci¯cally, let M be an uncountable and otherwise arbitrary set of costless signals (messages), with generic element m, and let b 2 < + denote a costly signal. So costly signals are associated with the positive reals. Then given any 4-tuple (a; t; m; b) 2 < £ [0; 1] £ M £ < + , the sender's and the receiver's preferences are (respectively) described by:
where x 2 (0; 1) is a scalar describing the extent to which the sender and the receiver share common preferences over (a; t)-pairs. In particular, assume that, for every (a; t)-pair, lim x!0 u S (a; t; x) = u R (a; t). We also assume u S and u R are at least twice di®erentiable in all arguments with¯nite¯rst derivatives at all (a; t) 2 < £ (0; 1), strictly concave in a with, for every t 2 [0; 1], arg max a2< u S (a; t) and arg max a2< u R (a; t; x)¯nite, and that the cross partials, u S 12 , u R 12 , and u S 13 are all strictly positive. 3 It follows that for any x > 0 and all t 2 [0; 1], arg max a2< u R (a; t) < arg max a2< u S (a; t; x) and the extent to which the sender's most preferred action exceeds that of the receiver's is increasing in x for any t.
In general the receiver chooses her action under uncertainty over the value of t. Assume the receiver and the sender share a common prior on t, described by the smooth probability density, h(t), with support [0; 1]. Let g(¢jm; b) denote the receiver's posterior beliefs over [0; 1] conditional on hearing a message m 2 M and a signal b 2 < + : Let P´M £ < + . Then the sender's strategy is given by:
where we write ¾(t) = (m(t); b(t)). The receiver's strategy is given by:
By virtue of M being uncountable and preferences being strictly concave in actions and increasing in the parameter t, the restriction to pure strategies in (??) and (??) is without loss of generality. For any signal (m; b) 2 P , let T ((m; b); ¾) = ft : ¾(t) = (m; b)g:
De¯nition 1 An equilibrium to the sender/receiver game described above is a list of strategies (¾ ¤ ; ® ¤ ) and posterior beliefs for the receiver g(¢jm; b) such that: Often we will refer to a strategy pair (¾; ®) as an equilibrium, leaving the restrictions on beliefs implicit. Say that an equilibrium is informative if the receiver's posterior belief over [0; 1] conditional on receiving some equilibrium signal is distinct from her prior belief; and say that an equilibrium is in°uential if the receiver's (equilibrium) strategy is not constant in (equilibrium) signals. Clearly, in°uential equilibria must be informative but the converse is not true. Finally, if ®(¾(t)) = a for some t 2 T ((m; b); ¾), say that the pair (¾; ®) elicits the action a. Thus at least two actions are elicited in any in°uential equilibrium, and we can identify one equilibrium as being more in°uential than another in terms of the relative number of distinct actions elicited in the two. For any equilibrium (¾; ®) let
denote the set of actions elicited by (¾; ®):
Because we are interested in the particular roles of cheap talk and costly signals, it is useful to disentangle their respective e®ects on the elicited actions. Evidently, for cheap talk per se to be in°uential at least two actions must be elicited in equilibrium by cheap talk messsages alone. Were this not the case then one can imagine an equilibrium (¾; ®) in which ¾(t) = (m ± ; 0) for all t ·t and ¾(t) = (m t ; b(t)) for all t >t, m t 6 = m ± , and b(t) strictly increasing in t. But in this case the cheap talk messages, while di®erent for some pairs of types, are irrelevant for the receiver's decision. Similarly, for burned money per se to be in°uential at least two actions must be elicited in equilibrium by costly signals themselves. These remarks motivate the following:
Note that an equilibrium exhibits both in°uential cheap talk and in°uential costly signals only if it elicits at least three actions.
The de¯nition above treats cheap talk and burned money asymmetrically. 
Equilibrium
One class of equilibria involves the receiver ignoring any costly signal and any equilibrium in this class is a Crawford and Sobel cheap talk equilibrium (hereafter, CS equilibrium). Crawford and Sobel [?, 1437] show that \essentially" all such equilibria are of the following form: there is a¯nite partition < t 0´0 ; t 1 ; :::; t N´1 > of the type space [0; 1] such that, for all i = 0; :::; N ¡ 1 and all types t 2 (t i ; t i+1 ], ¾(t) = m i and i 6 = j implies m i 6 = m j . The partitions are implicitly de¯ned by the incentive compatibility conditions in (e:1) which require boundary types t i to be indi®erent between sending the message associated with (t i¡1 ; t i ] and that associated with (t i ; t i+1 ]. Speci¯cally, since no type uses burned money in a CS equilibrium, (e:1) implies
Crawford and Sobel show that, for any x > 0, there is an equilibrium in which N = 1 and the equilibrium is neither informative nor in°uential. Further, for any x > 0 there exists a most in°uential equilibrium identi¯ed by the largest integer N such that t 1 > 0 and (??) holds; let N (x) be this integer. Then Crawford and Sobel show that as x ! 0, N (x) ! 1 and t i ¡ t i¡1 ! 0, i = 1; :::; N , and that there exists some¯nitex such that N(x) = 1 for all x >x. That is, if the sender's and the receiver's preferences coincide then the most in°uential equilibrium is fully separating in type whereas, if x >x, the only CS equilibrium is wholly uninformative. We argued in the Introduction that cheap talk messages are rarely the only feasible means of communication between a sender and a receiver.
What might be equilibria for this case? To begin, we derive some general properties of equilibria.
Given receiver beliefs g(sj¢) and any pair of types t · t 0 , let
and write y(t) = y(t; t) to save notation. Under the assumptions on u R , y(t; t 0 ) is strictly increasing in both arguments.
Proof. By incentive compatibility, for all t; t
Claim ( Hence, u S 11 < 0 and u R 12 > 0 imply u S 1 (y(t); t; x)y 0 (t) > 0 and, therefore, the equality implies b 0 (t) > 0 as claimed. Finally, adding the inequalities above and collecting terms yields
By assumption, u S 12 > 0 or, equivalently, u S (a; t; x) is supermodular in a and t. Claim (iii) now follows from t > t 0 .¤ There are two implications of Lemma 1 worth making explicit. Thē rst implication is that for any equilibrium (¾; ®), the set of types eliciting a given action is convex. To see this, let Z(a; ¾; ®) = ft : ®(¾(t)) = a, a 2 <g. Then the claim is trivially true if Z(a; ¾; ®) is empty or singleton; if t; t 0 2 Z(a; ¾; ®), t > t 0 , then Lemma 1(iii) implies that for all t ± 2 (t; t 0 ), ®(¾(t ± )) = a and hence t ± 2 Z(a; ¾; ®). It is evident that for all t; t 0 2 Z(a; ¾; ®), we must have
; that is, ¾(t) can di®er from ¾(t 0 ) in at most the cheap talk component of the signal. Therefore, by [?] , for any equilibrium (¾; ®), there exists an equilibrium (¾
. That is, if under (¾; ®) there exist multiple cheap talk messages associated with t 2 Z(a; ¾; ®), so all such messages elicit the action a, then there exists another equilibrium in which all t 2 Z(a; ¾; ®) send the same message and elicit the action a. As with Crawford and Sobel, \essentially" all equilibria have a partition structure in which types in any element of the partition either pool together by choosing the same signal and eliciting the same action, or all separate by choosing distinct costly signals and eliciting distinct actions.
The second implication of Lemma 1 is that the receiver's equilibrium strategy ®(¾(¢)), being monotonic and having range [0; 1], must be di®er-entiable almost everywhere on [0; 1] ([?]). Since the sender's equilibrium payo® U S (¢; t; ¢) is clearly continuous in t, this in turn implies that the burned money component of the sender's equilibrium strategy, b(¢), must likewise be di®erentiable almost everywhere on [0; 1] (although not necessarily monotonic). In particular, Lemma 1 gives that the only points at which, in equilibrium, b(¢) can be decreasing are discontinuity points (which only occur at the boundaries of partition segments). Moreover, if at some t 0 > 0 the sender's equilibrium strategy moves from a pooling to a separating segment as t increases, then necessarily lim "#0 b(t so u S (y(t 0 ); t 0 ; x) > u S (¹ y; t 0 ; x). But, by continuity, the incentive compatibility conditions implied by (e:1) require
which is impossible when b¸b 0 .
The following result shows that we can \squeeze in" separating segments at the far end of any CS equilibrium partition.
Theorem 1 Let (¾; ®) be a CS equilibrium with supporting partition < t 00 ; t 1 ; :::; t N´1 > : Then for allt 2 [0; t 1 ] there exists a partition < s 00 ; s 1 =t; s 2 ; :::; s N ; s N +1´1 > supporting an equilibrium (¾; ®)(t) such that:
where b(t) = R t 0 u S 1 (y(s); s; x)y 0 (s)ds + C(s N ) and
Proof. Let (¾; ®) denote the CS equilibrium in which N actions are elicited. Let < t 0´0 ; t 1 ; :::; t N´1 > be the partition supporting (¾; ®). This partition is de¯ned by (??). Lett 2 [0; t 1 ] and de¯ne the partition < s 0 ; s 1 ; :::; s N +1 > by s 0 = 0, s 1 =t, s N +1 = 1 and, 8i = 1; :::; N ¡ 1,
To see that such a partition exists for anyt < t 1 ,¯xt = s 1 2 [0; t 1 ). By de¯-nition of a CS equilibrium, u S (y(0; t 1 ); t 1 ; x) = u S (y(t 1 ; t 2 ); t 1 ; x) and, therefore, u S (y(0; t 1 ); s 1 ; x) > u S (y(t 1 ; t 2 ); s 1 ; x). By assumptions on the sender's and the receiver's preferences, y(0; s 1 ) < minfarg max a2< u S (a; s 1 ); y(0; t 1 )g and, by continuity and monotonicity of y(t; t 0 ) in both arguments, there exists a type s 2 > s 1 such that y(s 1 ; s 2 ) > y(0; s 1 ) and u S (y(0; s 1 ); s 1 ; x) = u 
Similarly, this receiver strategy is a best response to ¾(t) on [0; s N ). By de¯nition of C(s N
, the optimization problem of the sender of type t is equivalent to choosing:
By strict concavity, the solution to this problem is uniquely solved by b¸0 such that
By the inverse function rule, this equation is equivalent to
which, by de¯nition of b(¢), is solved at s = t. Hence, inequality (ii) holds and ¾(¢) is a best response to ®(¢) as required.¤ Figure 1 illustrates the theorem. Figure 1 here Theorem 1 immediately implies that although the same number of cheap talk messages are sent in the equilibrium (¾; ®)(t) as in the benchmark CS equilibrium, ast goes to zero the inferences the receiver draws from at least one such message become increasingly precise. In other words, the precision of cheap talk messages in the presence of burned money can increase relative to that when burned money is unavailable. Moreover, it is immediate from the theorem that if there exists a CS equilibrium that elicits N¸1 actions, there exists an equilibrium (¾; ®)(t) in which N actions are elicited through in°uential cheap talk and at least one action is elicited through in°uential burned money. In particular, because Theorem 1 goes through for N = 1, we have the following corollary. Then for all x > 0 and for allt 2 [0; 1] there exists an equilibrium such that, for all t 2 [0;t], ¾(t) = (m ± ; 0) and, for all t 2 (t; 1], ¾(t) = (m ± ;¯(t)+C(t)):
Proof. For any x > 0, there exists an uninformative CS equilibrium that elicits exactly one action. All such equilibria are supported by the degenerate partition < t 0´0 ; t 1´1 >. Let < 0;t; 1 > be a binary partition of [0; 1] witht 2 [0; 1]. De¯ne the strategies (¾; ®)(t) as in Theorem 1 with N = 1, save having the boundary typet pool with t <t rather than separate. By Theorem 1, (¾; ®)(t) is an equilibrium, completing the proof.¤ Whent = 0, the equilibrium (¾; ®)(0) is fully separating in t on [0; 1]; and whent = 1, the equilibrium (¾; ®)(1) is pooling in t on [0; 1]. Therefore, because the most in°uential cheap talk equilibrium when x = 0 is separating, Corollary 1 shows that there exists a separating equilibrium to the sender/receiver game for every value of x (conditional on the sender having a su±ciently lax budget constraint). In particular, for all x¸0, the equilibria (¾; ®)(0) and (¾; ®)(1) are the extremes of a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria: (¾; ®)(t),t 2 [0; 1]:
Theorem 1 implies that a su±cient condition for there to exist equilibria exhibiting both in°uential cheap talk and in°uential costly signals, is that there exist in°uential CS equilibria. In some settings this is also a necessary condition (see Proposition 1, below). More generally, in any in°uential CS equilibrium the lowest two actions (i.e. the¯rst two distinct actions elicited by the lowest types) are by de¯nition elicited by in°uential cheap talk. Hence Theorem 1 claims that, when such a CS equilibrium exists, there is an equilibrium in which the lowest two actions are also elicited by in°uential cheap talk and at least one higher action is elicited by burned money. Conversely, the next result implies that if there is any equilibrium in which the lowest two actions are elicited by in°uential cheap talk, then there is an in°uential CS equilibrium.
De¯nition 3 Let the partition < 0; t 1 ; : : : ; t N¡1 ; 1 > support an equilibrium (¾; ®). Say that (¾; ®) is a left-pooling in°uential equilibrium if t 1 > 0 and (i) N¸2; (ii) 8t 2 [0; t 1 ); ¾(t) = (m; b); (iii) b¸lim "#0 b(t 1 + "):
As we argued earlier, if the sender's equilibrium strategy is pooling on some interval (t; t 
Recall y(r; s) is strictly increasing in both arguments and, by assumption, u S 12 > 0. Hence,
with strict inequality if t 2 < 1. Similarly, y(t) < arg max a2< u S (a; t; x) for all t 2 [0; 1] implies V (0; 1; 1) < 0. Therefore, by continuity of best-response actions and equilibrium payo®s in type, y(0; t 1 ) < y(0; 1) < y(1) implies there exists some t ¤ 2 [t 1 ; 1) such that V (0; t ¤ ; 1) = 0. Now, for all is an in°uential CS equilibrium (with out-of-equilibrium messages identi¯ed by the receiver with, say, the equilibrium message m).¤ Theorems 1 and 2 say that, in the present model, the existence of burned money can improve the precision of cheap talk communication but may not expand the set of environments in which cheap talk is credible. However, Theorem 2 cannot be extended to cover all in°uential equilibria: there are circumstances in which equilibria exist exhibiting both in°uential cheap talk and in°uential burned money, but there is no in°uential CS equilibrium (of course, such equilibria cannot be left-pooling in°uential equilibria). To see this, let the prior distribution on types, h(¢), be a beta distribution on [0; 1] with parameters (¹; À) and assume preferences are quadratic:
Then for all t, arg max a2< U S (a; t; ¢) = t + x > y(t) = t. Assume the following parameterization obtains: . (Notice that the maximal burned money by any separating type is strictly smaller than the amount sent by types distinguished by their cheap talk signal; i.e. 2x(0:15) = 0:0347 < 0:0397.) Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium. Figure 2 here
The example shows there are situations in which the existence of burned money induces in°uential equilibrium cheap talk when it would otherwise be impossible. 4 Although we have been unable to provide a general theorem characterizing such situations (and it seems unlikely that one is readily available), Proposition 1, below, covering the special case of (¹; À) = (1; 1) (i.e. h(¢) uniform on [0; 1]) suggests that some sort of asymmetry is necessary. Furthermore, the uniform assumption on the distribution of types, along with that of quadratic preferences, has been much used in applied theoretical work involving cheap talk information transmission. Consequently, we consider it in some detail.
Example
Apart from providing a useful and salient illustration of the preceding results, the quadratic/uniform speci¯cation allows us to say something about the welfare properties of the equilibria identi¯ed above. And since these properties are the basis of the equilibrium selections made in the applied literature to permit comparative static results (e.g. [?]), checking the robustness of the properties to the introduction of burned money is important.
Throughout this section, assume the prior distribution over types, h(¢), is uniform on [0; 1] and that preferences are quadratic as de¯ned above. Then for all s · t, y(s; t) = [s + t]=2 (and, as before, arg max a2< U S (a; t; ¢) = t + x > y(t) = t). Applying (??), [?, 1440-4] show the arbitrage conditions characterizing any CS equilibrium here are t 0 = 0; t N = 1; and 8i = 1; :::; N; t i = t 1 i + 2i(i ¡ 1)x:
Given x and t N = 1, these equations imply
Thus, the number of actions elicited in the most in°uential equilibrium, N (x), identi¯ed by the largest integer N such that t 1 (N ) > 0, goes to 4 An associate editor o®ered the following¯nite game example. The sender may be one of three equally likely types, ft 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 g, and the receiver's action set contains three alternatives, fa1; a2; a3g. Dollar payo®s, (v S (a; t); v R (a; t)), without burned money are as follows: a1 a2 a3 t1 1; 1 0; 0 2; ¡10 t2 0; 0 1; 2 2; ¡10 t3 0; 0 1; ¡10 100; 1
:
It is easy to check that there is no in°uential cheap talk equilibrium. If, however, burned money is available, there is an equilibrium in which the type-t3 sender burns two dollars and types t1 and t2 separate with cheap talk. Clearly, the asymmetry in payo®s across types is important here.
in¯nity as x goes to zero and equals one for all x > 1=4; i.e. if x > 1=4 the only CS equilibrium is wholly uninformative. Now permit burned money to be used and consider the equilibrium constructed in Theorem 1. Suppose the partition < t 0´0 ; t 1 ; :::; t N´1 > supports a CS equilibrium in which N actions are elicited. Then for anŷ t 2 [0; t 1 ], the partition < s 0 ; s 1 ; :::; s N +1 > de¯ned in the proof to Theorem 1 is characterized by 
Given the CS equilibrium, equations (??) imply (t i ¡t i¡1 ) = t 1 +4x(i¡1), all i = 1; :::; N. Similarly, equations (??) above imply that for any s 1 2 [0; t 1 ), (s i ¡ s i¡1 ) = s 1 + 4x(i ¡ 1). Thus, for all i = 0; :::; N ¡ 1, the length of the interval of types sending any given message (m i ; 0) shrinks as s 1 goes to zero. So although the same number of cheap talk messages are sent in the equilibrium supported by (??) as in the benchmark CS equilibrium de¯ned by (??), as s 1 goes to zero the inference the receiver draws froms any such message becomes increasingly precise. Furthermore, with a uniform prior and quadratic preferences, Theorem 2 can be strengthened. ; b) and ®(¾(t)) 6 = ®(¾(t 0 )). Let a i = ®(¾(t)) and a j = ®(¾(t 0 )). Let Z`Ź (a`; ¾; ®),`= i; j. By earlier arguments, we know that Z i and Z j are disjoint convex sets. Let t`= inf Z`, t`+ 1 = sup Z`,`= i; j. Without loss of generality, assume t i+1 · t j . There are two cases: (i) t i+1 = t j , or (ii) t i+1 < t j : (i) Suppose t i+1 = t j , so j = i + 1. Then by (e:2) and (e:3), a i = [t i + t i+1 ]=2 and a j = [t i+1 + t i+2 ]=2. Hence, by continuity of equilibrium U S (¢; t; ¢) in t, incentive compatibility requires:
And this equality holds if and only if
is weakly increasing on (t i ; t j+1 ), then b(t) = b 8t 2 (t i ; t j+1 ) in which case, letting a k 2 A(¾; ®) be such that inf Z(a k ; ¾; ®) = t i+1 , setting j = k gives us situation (i). Therefore, b(¢) must be decreasing somewhere on (t i ; t j+1 ). Thus, by Lemma 1, 9t k 2 (t i ; t j+1 ) such that b(¢) is discontinuous at t k and,
and, without loss of generality, assume ¾(t k ) = (m 1 ; b 1 ). There are then two possibilities: either b(¢) is separating or b(¢) is pooling on some subinterval (t k ; t k+1 ). Let ¹ a = ®(¾(t k )). If b(¢) is separating on (t k ; t k+1 ), continuity of equilibrium U S (¢; t; ¢) in t and incentive compatibility require t k indi®erent between eliciting ¹ a and eliciting y(t k ) = t k . Therefore,
By Z(¹ a; ¾; ®) convex, (t k ¡¹ a)¸0. Hence the LHS of this equality is nonnegative but b 1 > b 2 . So b(¢) separating on (t k ; t k+1 ) is not possible. Assume b(¢) is pooling on (t k ; t k+1 ); then, for t 2 (t k ; t k+1 ), (e:2) and (e:3) imply ®(¾(t)) = [t k + t k+1 ]=2. Therefore, by continuity of equilibrium U S (¢; t; ¢) in t, incentive compatibility requires:
which implies
where ¢ = (b 1 ¡ b 2 ). Since ¹ a · t k < t k+1 · 1 and ¢ > 0, the RHS of the equation is strictly less than 1=4. This completes the proof of necessity.¤ With the example of the previous section, in which preferences are quadratic but the distribution of types is asymmetric, Proposition 1 indicates that the possibility of burned money inducing in°uential cheap talk depends in some way on asymmetries in the environment. Speci¯cally, there has to be su±cient di®erence between the payo®s high types can expect to achieve relative to low types, for otherwise the high types would be unwilling to burn the necessary money to dissuade low types from pooling with them in equilibrium.
For the family of equilibria identi¯ed in Corollary 1, in which only burned money is in°uential, the costly component of the signaling strategy for types greater thant is simply b(t) = 2xt +t 4 [t ¡ 4x]. Thus a semi-pooling equilibrium of this form exists fort 2 [0; 1] if and only if the sender has a budget of at least b(1) = 2x +t 4 [t ¡ 4x] to burn; in particular, a fully separating equilibrium in burned money (i.e. wheret = 0) exists if and only if the sender has a budget of at least 2x. Now consider some welfare properties of the equilibria for the quadratic preference and uniform prior case. Often a criterion of ex ante (i.e. before Nature reveals the sender's type t) e±ciency is invoked to justify focussing on the most in°uential rather than any less in°uential equilibrium (e.g. : only the most in°uential equilibrium is ex ante e±cient and, moreover, it uniquely de¯nes the most that cheap talk can achieve in the game. In this context, the following results, for the quadratic preference and uniform prior speci¯cation, are of some interest (the proofs of which, largely being tedious algebra, are omitted and available from the authors on request).
For any equilibrium´= (¾; ®), let ¹ u S (t; x;´) denote the´-equilibrium payo® to the sender of type t 2 [0; 1] given x > 0, and let ¹ u R (t;´) denote thé -equilibrium payo® to the receiver given the sender is type t. Let CS(N ) denote a CS equilibrium in which N actions are elicited (so CS(N (x)) is the (unique) most in°uential CS equilibrium at x) and, for any CS equilibrium (¾; ®), let (¾; ®)(t) be the equilibrium strategy pair constructed in the proof to Theorem 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose preferences are quadratic and the distribution of types is uniform. Suppose t 1 > 0 in the partition supporting the CS (N (x) ) equilibrium for x > 0. Then for allt 2 [0; t 1 );
The bene¯t to the sender from playing an equilibrium (¾; ®)(t) over the most in°uential CS equilibrium, CS(N(x)), is in the reduction of variance in nal payo®s that (¾; ®)(t) a®ords; the cost is in terms of the expected costly signal conditional on the realization of t being su±ciently high. When preferences are quadratic and there is a uniform prior on the unknown parameter (t), therefore, the proposition shows that the expected cost of burned money dominates the expected gain from more precise cheap talk. In the presence of costly signals, therefore, the ex ante selection criterion no longer yields a unique equilibrium. It follows that results in the applied literature that exploit such a selection need further quali¯cation.
More generally, the ex ante welfare criterion is suspect since it is sensitive to monotonic type-speci¯c transformations of the sender's utility schedule. Speci¯cally, suppose we rescale utilities so that
with v(t) > 0 all t 2 [0; 1]. Then for every t 2 [0; 1], the sender's interim optimal behaviour (i.e. once t is revealed) is invariant to the choice of v(t). But it is easy to see that any ex ante welfare calculation is certainly not invariant to the choice of v(t) across t. It is of some interest, therefore, to identify circumstances under which interim and ex ante calculations yield the same prediction. In particular, because the receiver is clearly best o® in the separating equilibrium with costly signals, (¾; ®)(0), identi¯ed in Corollary 1, the interesting questions involve the sender's welfare. An equilibrium (¾; ®) is said to be SP (t) if and only if ¾ is as de¯ned in Corollary 1,t 2 [0; 1]. Then SP (0) and SP (1) are, respectively, the fully separating equilibrium and the fully pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose preferences are quadratic and the distribution of types is uniform. For all x > 0 and t 2 [0; 1], ¹ u S (t; x; CS(N (x)))1 u S (t; x; SP (0)) with strict inequality for a set of types with strictly positive measure.
Proposition 3 says that all sender types prefer the most in°uential CS equilibrium, CS (N (x) ), to the most in°uential (separating) equilibrium, SP (0). (Of course, the receiver's preferences are the reverse.) Consequently, the proposition immediately yields, Corollary 2 LetŨ S (a; t; m; b) = ¡v(t)[(x + t ¡ a) 2 + b] be the sender's payo®, v(t) > 0 for all t 2 [0; 1] and assume the distribution of types is uniform. Then, for all x¸0, the sender ex ante strictly prefers CS(N (x)) to SP (0).
Because Proposition 3 obtains when N (x) = 1, a plausible conjecture is that for any semi-pooling equilibrium SP (t),t 2 (0; 1), all sender types likewise prefer the pooling equilibrium SP (1) to any SP (t) equilibrium, and prefer any SP (t) equilibrium to the separating equilibrium SP (0). However, so long as x < 1=2 (in the current speci¯cation) this conjecture is false in general. In particular, it can be shown that for any CS(N) equilibrium (¾; ®), there exists a (¾; ®)(t) equilibrium under which some sender types strictly prefer the (¾; ®)(t) equilibrium to the CS(N ) equilibrium [?] . For example, if N = 1 and x 2 (1=4; 1=2) the relevant (¾; ®)(t) equilibria are the semi-pooling equilibria SP (t) and, for anyt 2 (4x ¡ 1; 1), only moderate types strictly prefer the CS(1) (equivalently, the SP (1)) to the SP (t) equilibrium. Furthermore, since a positive measure of both high and low extreme types hold the opposite strict preference to that of the moderates, the set of types strictly preferring the SP (t) equilibrium to the CS(1) equilibrium here is not convex. Thus ex ante welfare calculations for the model are not always invariant to how payo®s are scaled across types.
Conclusion
The Crawford and Sobel model of cheap talk communication has been widely applied, and the extent to which results from such applications are robust depend in part on the extent to which the polar case of cheap talk only is a good approximation to a world in which both cheap talk and burned money might be used to signal information. The equilibrium results reported here suggest that if the sender has su±cient resources the polar case may be misleading, and so care should be exercised in interpreting applied results that rest on this case. In particular, Theorem 1 and its corollary showed how the burning money option can be used to signal essentially any amount of information, up to and including separation. But more importantly, we have also demonstrated a more indirect e®ect of this option, namely the ability to signal through cheap talk: while the conditions for in°uential cheap talk to exist in the Crawford/Sobel model are equivalent to those for a class of equilibria in the presence of burning money (Theorem 2), an example shows how burning money can actually allow for in°uential cheap talk when it could not otherwise exist. We also proved how the environments in which this indirect e®ect can occur must necessarily depart from the standard uniform/quadratic speci¯cation of the model (Proposition 1).
In many applied problems the focus is on the most in°uential of the available equilibria. Justi¯cations for such a focus typically rest on ex ante e±ciency arguments or on identifying the upper bound on credible information transmission. Our results indicate that, from the informed party's perspective, the ability to send a costly signal with burned money generates a con°ict between these two rationales. Speci¯cally, Proposition 3 demonstrates that (at least in the quadratic preference and uniform prior environment) even at the interim stage, the informed party invariably prefers the most in°uential cheap talk equilibrium to the fully separating (and hence fully informative) equilibrium. On the other hand, the remarks following the proposition indicate that a mix of cheap talk and separation through burned money can be preferred by a subset of informed sender types to any cheap talk equilibrium.
